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Abstract 
In this paper I address the interactions between biological knowledge and ideas about the kinds 
of entity that are suited to appropriation. I start by arguing that commodification and reductionism 
are closely linked, and that patenting suits entities that are discrete and isolable, such as those 
that are the focus of molecular biology. I then turn to the new field of systems biology, which 
recognises that traditional reductionist approaches to biology are no longer adequate, and 
attempts to provide a more integrative understanding of biological systems. In doing this, systems 
biology has to deal with emergent phenomena. But patenting does not suit the dynamic and 
interactive complexity that is the object of study in systems biology. If systems biology rejects 
reductionism where does that leave commodification? I examine attempts to commodify 
predictive computational models in systems biology. I then turn to systems biology’s sister 
discipline, synthetic biology, which deals with emergence by reducing the complexity of biological 
systems. By factoring out messy contingencies, synthetic biology is, in theory, well suited to 
commodification. Drawing on both these examples I explore how ideas about appropriation, 
including open source, are influencing the nature and course of research in biology. 
 
Keywords: systems biology, synthetic biology, intellectual property, emergence, 
commodification, disentanglement 
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Introduction 
My concern in this paper is with the relationship between the regulatory and the 
epistemic. My focus is on the two new fields of systems biology and synthetic biology, 
fields which aim to integrate high-throughput molecular data to provide a more complete 
understanding of the operation of biological systems. Both fields have to deal with 
emergent biological phenomena. My interest is in how ideas about the kinds of entity that 
are suited to appropriation affect the nature and production of biological knowledge, and 
I pay particular attention to attempts to commodify the emergent objects of the biological 
sciences to make them fit with intellectual property regimes.  
 
There has been a substantial amount of previous discussion of how commercialisation 
pressures may be influencing scientific research (see Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2001, 
Gibbons and Wittrock 1985, Gibbons et al. 1994, Hellström and Jacob 2005, Mirowski 
and Sent 2002, Nowotny et al. 2001, Slaughter and Rhoades 1996 and Thackray 1998). 
Some of this work has looked at the effects of commercialisation on research practices 
(e.g. Blumenthal et al. 1996, Behrens and Gray 2001 and Packer and Webster 1996), but 
there are very few actual examples of how the content of the research itself is affected by 
these pressures, such as Balmer’s (1996) discussion of the influence of patent policies in 
the choice of a particular DNA mapping strategy. This paper aims to contribute to this 
relatively neglected area of investigation. 
 
To outline the paper, I start by discussing commodification, and how it requires that a 
commodity be objectified and isolable, which means that it must be reduced or 
fragmented. I draw on Callon’s ideas about ‘disentanglement’ to make sense of how a 
commodity becomes extracted from the context in which it was previously embedded. 
Arguing that there are close links between commodification and reductionism, I then turn 
to reductionism in molecular biology. Patenting is heavily influenced by the molecular-
biological view of the world, and molecular biology, in turn, is well-suited to 
commodification. Systems biology, in contrast, attempts to integrate molecular level data 
and produce new understandings of biological systems. A key feature of systems biology 
is its readiness to embrace emergence, a concept which can be understood in various 
ways (e.g. in terms of unpredictability arising from interactions or contextual influences). 
Because of its inherently unbounded and unpredictable nature, emergence would seem to 
be particularly difficult to commodify. Actual patents in systems biology show how the 
‘commodification of emergence’ has operated in practice. After highlighting potential 
problems with the ‘anti-commons’ that could arise in systems biology patents, because of 
the interconnectedness of biological systems, I show that most systems biology patents 
relate to computational models, which are predictive and delimit the number of entities 
that need to be taken into account. I then turn to synthetic biology, a related field which 
attempts to construct biological systems. Synthetic biology aims to develop components 
which are standardized and interchangeable by reducing biological complexity and 
‘disentangling’ phenomena from their biological context. In this way it fits well with the 
requirements of commodification. I argue that in synthetic biology our ideas about 
appropriation may (albeit subtly and gradually) shape our ideas about the nature of living 
things.  I conclude that systems biology and synthetic biology deal with emergence in 
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different ways, and that the approach of synthetic biology is the one that is most likely to 
be taken up in public and policy debates. 
 
This paper grew out of a project focused on systems biology. This project involved 35 in-
depth interviews with scientists working in systems biology institutes in the US and the 
UK (referred to with code names throughout), and extended visits to three systems 
biology laboratories. The comparison with synthetic biology was brought up during the 
interviews and was explored further in an epistemological analysis and survey of this 
emerging field (see O’Malley et al. 2008). The synthetic biology material is also based on 
attendance at workshops and conferences on synthetic biology, membership of a UK 
synthetic biology network, and discussions with synthetic biologists. With the empirical 
material as background, this paper primarily draws on commentaries on these two fields 
from scientists, philosophers, lawyers and other theorists. 
 
Commodification 
At a very simple level, a commodity is something that can be bought or sold. For 
something to be a commodity it must be objectified (Sharp 2000), i.e. made in to a ‘thing’ 
(Mirowski and Sent 2007). As Marx (1887) famously said, a commodity is ‘an object 
outside us’.  For something to be a ‘thing’ it must be fragmented, or, as Jacob puts it, 
‘reduced to a format that makes it possible to make an exclusive package or artefact for 
which an exchange value may be established’ (Jacob 2003:127). The use of the word 
‘reduced’ here is interesting, and hints of the links between reductionism and 
commodification. 
 
Since a commodity is a ‘thing’ or a ‘package’ which must be fungible, i.e. 
interchangeable with other objects (Lind and Barham 2004:51), it must have clear 
boundaries: it must be obvious where it ends and where the rest of the world begins. Here 
it is helpful to draw on the idea, which can be found in Adam Smith (see Schaffer 2003), 
that ‘disentanglement’ is necessary for commodification. Callon (2007) has provided 
helpful elaboration of ‘disentanglement’, which he describes as a process ‘through which, 
with growing force and clarity, a world exists in which entities are transformed (and 
retransformed) into things and then goods…that can circulate’ (p.343). The notion of 
disentanglement makes it clear that commodities do not come ready-made, 
‘decontextualized, dissociated and detached’ (Callon 1998:19), but instead that they must 
be first extracted from the network of relationships in which they are already embedded 
(Holm 2007). This process of disentanglement requires the mobilisation of resources, 
social and economic actors, and institutions (see Parry 2008). It is only after these 
complex negotiations and iterations that we are left with a commodity, an apparently 
stable object. I will show how these ideas of disentanglement can be very helpful, 
particularly when it comes to understanding the practices of synthetic biology. But before 
turning to these issues, it is necessary to focus on the links between commodification and 
reductionism.  
 
Reductionism is important for my argument, because the two new forms of biology 
that are my focus here – systems biology and synthetic biology – are both based on a 
belief that traditional reductionist approaches to biology are no longer adequate. If 
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biology rejects reductionism where does that leave commodification? To help make 
sense of the issue, and to put the two new fields in context, it is useful to discuss 
reductionism in traditional molecular biology, and its links to commodification. 
 
Reductionism and molecular biology 
Reductionism in biology is the view that ‘all complex entities (including proteins, 
cells, organisms, ecosystems) can be completely explained by the properties of their 
component parts’ (Gilbert and Sarkar 2000:1). Molecular biology, as its name 
suggests, focuses on the molecular level and ‘encourages the belief that a detailed 
understanding of individual molecular properties may be sufficient to account fully for 
cellular and organismic phenomena’ (Powell and Dupré forthcoming p.6). The 
aspiration is that biology will ultimately be explainable in terms of physics and 
chemistry (Crick 1966). 
 
Molecular biology became consolidated as the dominant perspective in biology after 
the discovery of the structure of DNA in 1953 (Powell et al 2007), and still holds a 
huge amount of institutional and epistemic power. This is demonstrated by the fact 
that patenting is heavily influenced by the molecular biological view of the world. We 
see this in the understanding of the gene that is adopted in patent practice, where it is 
considered that ‘[a] gene is but a chemical, albeit a complex one’ (Amgen Inc. v. 
Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. 1989). In patenting it is seen as perfectly appropriate to 
think of a gene in this reductionist way as entirely explicable in terms of its chemical 
constituents. This approach to understanding genes becomes problematic, however, in 
the context of research which shows that genes are highly interactive, have many 
different biological functions and operate in diverse biological processes (Pearson 
2006). DNA’s chemical nature seems insufficient to account for all the consequences 
of gene action, which depend on the biological context in which the gene is operating 
and on the presence of a large cast of supporting mechanisms, without which genes are 
impotent (Moss 2003). 
 
Reductionist understandings of the nature of biological phenomena fit very well with 
intellectual property regimes. McAfee (2003) argues that molecular-genetic reductionism 
supports certain kinds of economic reductionist arguments, and that this ‘double 
reductionism’, as she calls it, ‘furthers the extension of the commodity realm to the 
molecular level.’ (p.203). She maintains that seeing genes as ‘unitary objects with stable, 
predictable properties provides conceptual support for treating genetic constructs as 
tradable commodities which are subject to market exchange and to the assumptions of 
neoclassical economics’ (p.204). In this way reductionism and patenting are mutually 
supportive. 
 
But this reductionist perspective has limitations, and these limitations are being 
confronted in systems biology, which attempts to integrate diverse sources of 
molecular data and generate a more complete understanding of biological phenomena, 
an understanding which introduces the notion of emergence. 
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Systems biology 
In brief, systems biology is an approach to biology that uses complex computational and 
mathematical tools to make sense of the vast amounts of data generated by genome 
sequencing projects and other molecular data-gathering exercises (Auffray et al., 2003). 
It is based on the realisation that the interactions between biological molecules and the 
networks that result are far too complex to be analysed without computational techniques. 
A key aim of the field is to produce dynamic in silico models of biological systems. 
 
As with most new fields there is no consensus on the definition of systems biology. One 
derogatory way of describing it is ‘physiology with advertising’ (Interview34). And it has 
been pointed out that the field fits conveniently into current fashions for network thinking 
(Bonneuil and Gaudillière 2007). Systems biologists argue, however, that what makes the 
field new is the kinds of technologies that are being used to study biological systems, the 
accumulated molecular data, and, perhaps most importantly, the integration of many 
different types of data. 
 
Systems biology and molecular biology 
It is helpful to compare systems biology with molecular biology, to draw out some of the 
key differences. Systems biology is often portrayed as being the biological revolution that 
will replace molecular biology. For example, a scientist working in one of the new 
institutes for systems biology says ‘we’re now going to have to create a new way of 
thinking about biology that’s going to be as great a revolution as the molecular revolution 
was’ (Interview11). 
 
Commentators such as Keller (2005) note that ‘the reductionist phase of genetic research 
is now over’ (p.103), and one of the central claims made by many systems biologists is 
that their field it is not reductionist, and in fact is a reaction to ‘the essential failure of the 
reductionist agenda’ (Interview20). One scientist says revealingly that systems biology is 
‘the name of the crisis; it’s the name of the fright that everyone’s gone into about having 
all the pieces and still not knowing how biology works’ (Interview34). 
 
Some see molecular biology as a detour in the history of biology, and they portray it as 
the antithesis of systems biology (Interview11 and Interview34). A systems biologist, for 
example, says ‘it’s still very much an ‘us and them’ thing between the molecular and the 
systems people’ (Interview20). This can even influence scientific work, since ‘practicing 
systems biologists are often hindered by paradigm battles with molecular biologists’ 
(Boogerd et al. 2007:5). Others, however, argue for more of a continuation between the 
two: ‘systems biology is based on the progress of molecular biology because we need to 
know components, but knowing components is not knowing life’ (Interview33). 
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Emergence in systems biology 
According to some interpretations, a key feature of systems biology is emergence. Van 
Regenmortel (2004) says that ‘‘emergence’ has appeared as a new concept that 
complements ‘reduction’ when reduction fails’ (p.1016). Some commentators ‘maintain 
that the concept of emergence is destined to be associated with systems thinking in much 
the same way that reductionism has come to be regarded as molecular biology’s 
philosophical counterpart’ (Powell and Dupré forthcoming p.9).  
 
Emergence is a concept that is notoriously hard to pin down, and the brief attempt I make 
here will, I hope, serve my purposes of understanding the implications of emergence for 
intellectual property. The traditional idea of emergence is that something is more than the 
sum of its parts (which explains the comment of one systems biologist: ‘is the sum 
greater than the parts? If it’s not, it’s not systems biology’ Inteview34). Another way of 
explaining this is to say that the characteristic properties of the whole cannot be deduced 
from the most complete knowledge of the properties of the constituents (see Broad 1925). 
In this way unpredictability is a key feature of emergence (Hodgson 2000). An example 
of an emergent property is ‘wetness’; a single molecule alone cannot be wet, only a 
collection of molecules can (Gilbert and Sarkar 2000). Another evocative example of 
emergence is given in respect to systems biology:  
 
‘What is the difference between a live cat and a dead one? One scientific 
answer is ‘systems biology’. A dead cat is a collection of its component 
parts. A live cat is the emergent behaviour of the system incorporating 
those parts’ (Nature 2005:1).  
 
This example is interesting not only for its colour but also because it links emergence to 
the idea of something being alive. Emergence is closely connected to notions of life, 
since ‘Living systems being nonlinear dynamical systems, have properties different from 
their constituents in isolation’ (Boogerd et al. 2007:12). This point will become important 
in respect to the discussion of synthetic biology below. 
 
Some commentators distinguish between weak and strong emergence (Boogerd et al. 
2007). Weak emergence is where it is not possible to explain or predict the properties of 
an emergent object, because the components work differently together than they do apart, 
but such an explanation may be possible in the future, with increased knowledge and 
understanding of the phenomena. Strong emergence is where ‘system behaviour cannot 
be inferred or predicted from the behavior of components in isolation’ (Boogerd et al. 
2007:330). In this case it is not possible in principle to predict emergent properties from 
first principles (Richardson and Stephan 2007). 
 
There is much discussion of the nature of emergence, which is not, of course, only found 
in biological contexts, but is also present in social life, and in law (Hodgson 2000). But 
what is of immediate concern to me here is how the concept is used in scientific practice. 
Many biologists treat emergence as if it simply involves taking context into account 
(Powell and Dupré forthcoming). If context is important in understanding a biological 
phenomenon then it makes sense to assume that an understanding of constituent parts 
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isolated from their context will never lead to a complete explanation of this phenomenon 
(Gilbert and Sarkar 2000). A corollary of this point is that environment, or context, 
becomes more important in systems biology than it was in reductionist molecular 
biology. As the boundaries of a biological system become looser and more permeable, 
and less causally decoupled from the environment, so the system becomes less amenable 
to commodification. Another factor which decreases the ‘boundability’ of biological 
systems is the fact that they are open: ‘they exchange matter and energy with their 
environment’ (Van Regenmortel 2004: 1017). 
 
It may be counter-productive to attempt to provide a precise definition of emergence. As 
Powell and Dupré show, ‘emergence concepts remain relatively undeveloped, and it may 
even be that some of their contemporary utility stems from their ambiguity’ (p.18). What 
I am calling emergence others may prefer to call wholism, interactionism, or organicism 
(see Gilbert and Sarkar 2000).  The concept of emergence is sufficiently ambiguous and 
vague to incorporate these different ideas. 
 
Having emphasized the connections between emergence and systems biology it is 
necessary to note that some commentators argue that systems biology is not genuinely 
concerned with emergence, but is just reductionism writ large. For example, one critic 
says of certain varieties of systems biology: ‘This is brute-force, geno-centric 
reductionism in the guise of entireness, rather than a novel integrative approach devoted 
to wholeness’ (Huang 2000: 471). Although this statement is intended as a criticism of 
the whole enterprise of systems biology, some systems biologists themselves are explicit 
about their own reductionist objectives, and do not see the label ‘reductionist’ as a slur 
(Interview7). One, for example, thinks that ‘the systems stuff’s really a starting point for 
the reductionist biology’ (Interview24). Another says ‘what we have got to emphasize is 
a molecular level analysis, so we need to be able to trace back emergent properties or life 
or biology, phenotypes, whatever we’re looking at, to the molecular underpinnings’ 
(Interview9). There is a truism underlying these points that ‘science cannot proceed 
without some dissection and some analysis of parts’ (Hodgson 2000:73), and no one I 
interviewed would have denied this. It would be overly simplistic to imply that systems 
biology is only concerned with wholes and that there is no place for reductionist analysis 
in this field. 
 
It remains the case, however, that the dominant discourse of systems biology is one of 
anti-reductionism, and this is something that systems biologists often draw upon when 
defining their work in opposition to previous molecular biology. This discourse is so 
pervasive that the BBSRC, the UK’s largest funder of systems biology, recently felt the 
need to reassure the UK’s scientific community that ‘BBSRC has not become anti-
reductionist as a result of encouraging the uptake of systems biology approaches. BBSRC 
maintains a neutral position here…It acknowledges that the molecular-level research it 
has funded – and continues to fund – is an important part of the picture’ (BBSRC 2006).  
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Patenting in systems biology 
Attempts have been made to commodify systems biology, and it is helpful to examine the 
patents that have been granted in the field. As we have seen in the discussion of 
commodification above, patenting suits entities that are fixed, static and excluded from 
external intervention. This is far from the dynamic and interactive complexity that is the 
object of study in systems biology.  
 
One systems biologist makes an important point about interactivity and its implications 
for patenting in systems biology. He says that since that the most important biological 
properties come from the operation of systems and not from the operation of individual 
genes ‘if you want to acquire intellectual property…you can’t do so by patenting 
individual genes, you’ve got to patent a system or a collection of genes’ (Interview3).  
 
This is one strategy in systems biology patenting, and already there are patents on 
networks of interacting molecules, which Allarakhia and Wensley (2005) identify as 
systems biology patents. These patents have given rise to concern that patenting a whole 
system or network could have negative consequences for further research, since ‘actions 
that result in the enclosing of large research terrains are more likely to have significant 
impact on technological opportunities available for follow-on developers’ (Allarakhia 
and Wensley 2005:1485). The patent model is based on the idea that innovations are 
discrete and separable from their context. As we have seen, this is not the case with 
interconnected biological systems. The danger of ‘enclosing of large research terrains’ is 
an example of the ‘tragedy of the anti-commons’ (Heller and Eisenberg 1998), which is 
the situation where the existence of patents leads to the neglect of large areas of research 
which would otherwise be ripe for innovation and exploitation. 
 
There are dissenters to the ‘tragedy of the anti-commons’ argument (see Caulfield et al 
2006). Adelman (2005), for example, argues that the redundancies of biological systems 
mean that ‘work-arounds’ will actually be easier in biology than they would be in other 
fields, and research questions will be approachable from several different directions. 
However, I think that Adelman underestimates the interactivity and complexity of 
biological systems. A ‘work around’ in biology is very likely to have unintended and 
unforeseen knock-on effects on other parts of a biological system, and as a result it is 
unlikely that totally separate lines of research could be pursued. 
 
Because of this interconnectedness of biological systems, there do appear to be some 
immediate difficulties with patents on interacting biological networks, which could be 
thought of as systems biology patents. It is necessary to note here that in attempting to 
identify systems biology patents there is a definitional problem. There is no class for 
patents in systems biology per se, so those that other sources have identified as systems 
biology patents (e.g. Allarakhia and Wensley 2005, Nature Biotechnology 2005 and 
Russell 2006) are based on assumptions about the kinds of patents that they think are 
representative of the field. 
 
Apart from patents on biological networks, other examples given of systems biology 
patents are on computer-based models of biological systems. This is because most 
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systems biology companies are attempting to simulate disease and drug action in silico 
(Mack 2004). For example, the company Optimata has been granted a patent which 
allows ‘virtual trials’ of drugs on a computer (Russell 2006). Other patents are on 
biosimulation tools with names like ‘virtual patient’, ‘virtual human’ or ‘visual cell’ 
(Uehling 2003). There are similar patent applications pending on computer models, 
including a method of constructing a gene network from quantitative data, a biological 
network model, and a system for simulating the operation of biochemical systems 
(Nature Biotechnology 2005). As well as bringing up issues about the legitimacy of 
patenting computer software (issues that I do not have space to discuss here), these 
patents raise interesting questions about what constitutes a model in systems biology. 
 
A model is not simply a description of a biological system, because it is necessarily a 
simplification of the system (without this simplification it would not be a model, it would 
just be a representation of the system), and it also incorporates hypotheses about how the 
system is thought to work (Interview23). Both of these features could be argued to make 
biological models amenable to commodification. Because a model limits what it is 
included within it, it becomes more bounded than the actual biological system. 
Furthermore, the incorporation of hypotheses about how the system is thought to work 
gives the model the facility to be predictive. Boogerd et al. (2007) explain how in 
systems biology ‘emergent properties are predicted by calculating how the model 
behaves in silico and compared to observations made on the system level’ (p.6). We also 
saw above that commodification requires ‘unitary objects with stable, predictable 
properties’ (McAfee 2003:204 emphasis added). If models give us the facility to be 
predictive, then they may lend themselves to commodification. 
 
One of the key features of emergent phenomena, however, is that it is not possible to 
predict their properties from the properties of the component parts. Here we see that the 
‘commodification of emergence’ in the case of predictive computational models is 
actually the commodification of weak, rather than strong, emergence, because the 
definition of strong emergence is that prediction is not possible in principle, however 
advanced our knowledge of the phenomena. Wynne argues that this emphasis on 
predictive modelling in systems biology ‘effectively deletes the issues of emergence’ 
(Wynne 2005:76). This is the case if we think in terms of strong emergence, but not if we 
are concerned with weak emergence. We may want to conclude, however, along with 
Wynne, that in terms of strong emergence, the successful predictive modelling of a 
biological system means that it will come to be understood as something which does not 
possess emergent properties. According to systems biologists Westerhoff and Kell 
(2007), systems biology does not embrace strong emergence because it is guided by the 
hope that ‘life is calculable and can therefore be captured in a computer model’ (p.64). 
The research programme that is grounded in this hope that ‘life is calculable’, and that it 
is possible to eliminate the unpredictable characteristics of biological phenomena, is 
systems biology’s sister discipline: synthetic biology. 
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Synthetic biology 
The objectives of synthetic biology are to construct novel biological systems and to 
redesign existing ones. Some see synthetic biology as providing an empirical test of the 
models in systems biology by trying to build them as functioning biological systems 
(Barrett et al 2006). Others see synthetic biology as a distinct field with autonomous aims 
(Endy 2005). Nevertheless, synthetic biology and systems biology have much in 
common. They both developed in the 2000s and they are both concerned with 
understanding the operation of biological systems by making use of modelling and 
systems design (Brent 2004). Both frequently draw analogies between biological systems 
and electronic circuits, and endorse approaches which draw on engineering and the 
physical sciences. Synthetic biology can  be conceived of as ‘the other side of the coin of 
systems biology’ (Victor de Lorenzo in Breithaupt 2006:21), or ‘systems biology in 
reverse’ (Interview30), because rather than learning about a biological system, going on 
to model it in silico, and then perhaps attempting to build it, synthetic biology starts with 
the construction of the biological system. Most importantly for my purposes, synthetic 
biology has been called ‘a reductionist approach to systems biology’ (James Collins in 
Ferber 2004:158). 
 
Synthetic biology is a disparate field and incorporates a range of different activities, from 
attempts to create protocells (by inserting molecular components into lipid vesicles), to 
attempts to strip away excess DNA from existing genomes.  The disparate nature of the 
field means that it would be inappropriate to generalize about its approach to emergence 
(see O’Malley et al 2008). Some strands of synthetic biology, for example the protocell 
school, make the complexity and emergence of biological systems explicit topics of 
investigation. Benner and Sismour (2005), scientists who engage in DNA synthesis, also 
embrace emergent properties, saying that the aim of synthetic biology is ‘to create in 
unnatural chemical systems the emergent properties of living systems’ (p.533). But here I 
will focus on the most well-known and well-funded strand of synthetic biology which 
aims to make biology into an engineering discipline (Endy 2005). To this end, these 
synthetic biologists draw on the engineering principles of standardisation, decoupling and 
abstraction (Brent 2004) with the objective of developing biological components which 
are interchangeable, functionally discrete and capable of being combined easily in a 
modular fashion (i.e. ‘plug and play’, see Isaacs and Collins 2005). My argument here is 
that the attempt to reduce complexity conveniently makes this flavour of synthetic 
biology well-suited to commodification and to existing appropriation regimes. This is 
because: 
 
‘the more dramatically researchers can reduce the complexity of biological 
organisms, the better they can turn these organisms into instrumentalizable 
media and simultaneously reduce the difficulties…of the encounter 
between biotechnologies and patent law’ (Pottage 2007: 330). 
 
If a biological entity is made into one that it is discrete then it becomes amenable to 
patenting, and also to open source. My point is that ideas about appropriation, including 
open source approaches, are influencing the course of research in this branch of synthetic 
biology. Franklin (2003) observes a similar phenomenon in cloning, a technique which 
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makes reproduction more exact and replicable than it would be otherwise. Drawing on 
Franklin’s (2003) work, Hoeyer (2007) notes that it was developments in patenting which 
made animal cloning into a viable industry because ‘cloning circumvents the 
heterogeneity introduced by sexual reproduction and thus stabilizes the object of 
ownership in accordance with the rules of the property regime (p.341, emphasis added). 
As in synthetic biology, in cloning scientific and technological developments make the 
biological entity more stable, less heterogeneous and more suitable for commodification. 
 
Intellectual property in synthetic biology 
It is not yet clear how the intellectual property issues in the dominant strand of synthetic 
biology will play out. At the moment the information needed to build the functional and 
interchangeable parts (called ‘biobricks’) that are the focus of much current effort in 
systems biology is freely available on the web, although there is much discussion about 
whether it should remain so (see Henkel and Maurer 2007, Rai and Boyle 2007, Kumar 
and Rai 2007, and Maurer 2006). More complicated constructed networks and systems 
are the subject of patent applications (e.g. Keasling et al 2007), and patents on the 
technology for gene synthesis have recently been the focus of litigation battles between 
companies (see GenomeWeb Daily News 2008). In contrast to these proprietary strands, 
the ‘biobricks’ school often make a point of articulating their open source aspirations 
(e.g. Keasling 2005), not least because they explicitly attempt to make synthetic biology 
more similar to software code which is modular, standardized and re-useable (explaining 
why some people think a better name for the field would be ‘modular biology’, see De 
Vriend 2006:25). Modular entities are ideal for open source because they can be worked 
on simultaneously by a large community of both users and producers, and this can speed 
the development of the field. 
 
We should not be lulled into thinking that because this field models itself on open source 
it is removed from the pressures of intellectual property. Although there are several 
different understandings of open source in circulation (Stallman 2007), in its most 
familiar incarnation – open source software – it relies on copyright and uses open source 
licenses (such as copyleft) to compel inventors to share their intellectual property. A self-
consciously open source initiative in the biosciences (Biological Innovation for Open 
Society) produces biological licences where members agree not to assert their IP rights 
against one another (BIOS 2008). In these cases open source itself depends on the 
existence of prior property rights. Rather than being a substitute for intellectual property, 
open source is perhaps more correctly conceived of as a mosaic of private property 
(Biagioli 2007). For this reason appropriation is just as important in open source as it is in 
more conventional property rights (Rai and Boyle 2007, Kumar and Rai 2007).  
 
In forcing biology into the mould of engineering, by developing discrete and substitutable 
parts, synthetic biology is simultaneously making biology better fit intellectual property 
regimes. This is not a coincidence, because patent law developed in the context of 
industrial manufacturing (see Pottage and Sherman 2007). It is also consistent with the 
direction of biotechnology more generally, which can be seen as ‘relentlessly pursuing 
the program of making every element of the world programmable or susceptible to 
engineering’ (Pottage 2007:340). 
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The reduction of complexity 
For some, the reduction of complexity needed to make biology into an engineering 
discipline is not merely an instrumental aim, but is based on a faith that synthetic biology 
will ultimately lead to ‘the elucidation of the underlying simplicity’ of nature (Palsson 
2000:1149). Many synthetic biologists hope that the complexity of biological systems, a 
key concern in systems biology, might be an eliminable accident of historical 
accumulations over evolutionary time (Balaram 2003). Programmatic statements along 
these lines are common. For example, Heinemann and Panke (2006) say: ‘As the 
complexity of existing biological systems is the major problem in implementing synthetic 
biology’s engineering vision, it is desirable to reduce this complexity’ (p.2793) 
 
The reduction of complexity may not be achievable, however. Synthetic biologists such 
as those in Ron Weiss’s group advise that ‘it may be prudent to treat some biological 
uncertainties as fundamental properties of individual cell behavior’ (Andrianantoandro et 
al 2006:13). They continue in a way that reminds us of the understanding of emergence 
as dependence on context: 
 
‘A biological device has no meaning isolated from a module; a module has no 
meaning isolated from a cell; a cell has no meaning isolated from a population of 
cells. This contextual dependence is an essential feature of living systems’ (p.13) 
 
The concern here is that by attempting to eliminate complexity and contingency, 
synthetic biologists might end up losing sight of the emergent properties that define 
living systems, which are themselves historical accumulations, being the result of billions 
of years of evolution (Balaram 2003 and Dupré 2007). Andrianantoandro et al. (2006) 
stress that a recognition of the contextual dependence of living systems is necessary to 
engineer them successfully, and that the ‘notions of standardization, decoupling, and 
abstraction must therefore be recast to better reflect the complexity of the cellular 
contexts’ (p.12). In this way they acknowledge that biological systems may not be fully 
susceptible to engineering goals. Marguet et al. (2007) also worry that if synthetic 
biology’s standardization agenda is pushed too far this will remove the flexibility that is 
needed for engineered systems to be useful, which will result in the design of synthetic 
systems that will ultimately fail. Wimmer (quoted in Breithaupt, 2006) predicts this in 
saying that ‘the engineers will find out that the bacteria are just laughing at them’ (p.23). 
 
If the complexity of biological systems is inescapable, then commercialisation will have 
to adapt to this. Andrianantoandro et al (2006) suggest that rather than producing 
standardized parts, synthetic biologists could take into account uncertainty and context-
dependence and engage in ‘on demand, just-in-time customization of biological devices 
and components, which need not behave perfectly’ (p.13). But this goes against the grain 
of the field overall which is optimistic that it will succeed in making biology more like 
engineering, and hence more easily commodifiable. 
 
Perhaps the most (in)famous synthetic biology patent application is Craig Venter’s 
application filed in May 2007 for the smallest genome needed for a living organism 
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(Glass et al 2007). On a superficial level, this patent could be seen to be founded on 
reductionist assumptions, because it is a patent on DNA as the essential constituent of a 
living organism. However, closer analysis of the patent shows that the context is a crucial 
constituent. The genome will only work if implanted into a ‘rich bacterial medium’, 
which possesses properties that are undefined in the patent. Since the environment is a 
crucial part of the patent, there is scope for emergence in this ‘patent on life’. 
 
Synthetic biology tries to avoid the problems associated with emergence by eliminating 
all the messy contingencies and complexities of biological systems, in this way making 
them amenable to certain reductionist visions of commodification (perhaps sneaking in 
some context by the back door, as in the Venter patent). Whether attempts to reduce 
biological complexity and commodify emergence will succeed is an empirical question, 
but it is one where the answer will have important implications for intellectual property. 
If biological systems can be shaped into the form necessary for them to be exchanged in 
the market economy we may have to change our understanding of what ‘life’ is in the 
process. 
 
This point brings us back to the issues of ‘disentanglement’ raised at the start of the 
paper. In attempting to reduce the complexity of biological systems, and shape them into 
exchangeable parts, well-suited to commodification, synthetic biology is itself engaged in 
‘disentanglement’. Furthermore, this process of disentanglement is contaminated with 
pre-existing ideas about which forms of intellectual property would be most appropriate 
for the developing technology. This is particularly important because synthetic biology 
does not simply aim to describe or to represent life; it aims to create it. We do not merely 
have an example of ‘intervening’ here, where scientific effects are found only in the 
context of a certain experimental situation (see Hacking 1983). In synthetic biology the 
intervention into nature is more profound, because synthetic biology is the deliberate 
attempt to design living organisms. Synthetic biology, like other biotechnologies that 
have preceded it, works by ‘extending the reach of human manufactures into the texture 
of life itself’ (Pottage 2007:324). The fact that our creations of potentially new life forms 
are heavily influenced by certain preconceptions about appropriation may be worrying to 
some. 
 
Concerns have been expressed for many decades about the potential influence of 
commercialisation pressures on the content of scientific research, but it has proved 
difficult to give specific examples of how the content of the research is itself influenced 
by commercial pressures. In the case of synthetic biology we can see economic 
considerations about the nature of property influencing the direction of the development 
of the field, and influencing it in a way which could have profound future implications. 
 
This is not to argue for some kind of economic determinism, where intellectual property 
concerns dictate the course of scientific research. We clearly have a case of ‘co-
production’ of the scientific and the social/legal here (Jasnaoff 2004). For examples of 
influence in the other direction, we have seen how gene patenting has been heavily 
influenced by the molecular biological idea that genes are a kind of chemical molecule, 
and how patenting as an institution was itself strongly influenced by the engineering and 
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manufacturing paradigm of the early nineteenth century (Pottage 2007). It is also likely 
that intellectual property regimes will be further influenced by the developments in 
systems and synthetic biology that I have been addressing here. But being aware of the 
interactions between biological and patenting spheres is not to take force away from the 
point that our ideas about appropriation may come to shape our ideas about the nature of 
living things. 
 
Emergence in policy debates and public discourses  
My examples of synthetic and systems biology show that there are two different 
regulatory paths that could be taken in response to the integrative life sciences. On the 
one hand, as discussed in respect to synthetic biology above, effort may go into shutting 
down the unpredictabilities and complexities associated with emergence so that life fits 
better into existing ownership regimes. On the other hand, the problems with 
commodifying the emergent objects of systems biology, as well as the views of those 
synthetic biologists who doubt that biological complexity can ever be successfully 
‘reduced’, may lead us to acknowledge that it is not possible to commodify emergent 
phenomena. This could lead to new ways of thinking about appropriation in the life 
sciences in general and could take regulation in new directions.  
 
For example, we saw above how the appropriation of interconnected and networked 
biological systems could lead to the tragedy of the anti-commons. In situations such as 
this, an argument which is often made is that it is more economically efficient to keep 
these biological systems in the public domain (Allaharia and Wensley 2006) and ‘outside 
the world of property’ (Rai and Boyle 2007). Doing this would involve giving up on the 
attempt to commodify emergence. There is also Andrianantoandro et al’s (2006) 
suggestion that with emergent systems all we can aspire to is bespoke customisation of 
biological components, the results of which would be imperfect and retain elements of 
unpredictability. This just-in time customization would not demand the reductionism 
associated with commodification. 
 
A recognition of the irreducibility of biological systems could perhaps have broader 
consequences. Thinking of the objects of biology in this way could lead to a shift in 
mind-set to incorporate context and indeterminacy. It could even be the case that the 
discourses of emergence and complexity we find in systems biology will be taken up 
more broadly (perhaps tying into popular forms of holistic thinking). This may lead to the 
development of new and as yet unimagined forms of regulation more aligned with these 
ways of thinking in the biological sciences. This, in turn, could change the tone of 
discussions about the implications of new biotechnologies. 
 
Alternatively, and probably more realistically, the pressures to reduce complexity may 
dominate, and the route taken by synthetic biology may come to dictate regulatory 
thinking. We saw above how the engineering approach that synthetic biology adopts is 
historically tied to intellectual property regimes, and the combination of the instrumental 
power of engineering approaches and the economic pressures to commodify may prove 
irresistible. Additionally, in comparison to systems biology, synthetic biology’s 
reductionist agenda may relate more easily to culturally pervasive notions of the 
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importance of DNA (Ashcroft 2003). Even though it is a newer and less cohesive field, 
synthetic biology is already receiving much more public, media and policy attention than 
systems biology. Nature’s subtlety and recalcitrance may appear to be an obstacle at the 
moment, but in the future we may see life being reshaped in a way that fits better with 
economic imperatives. 
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